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4.1 Introduction 
 
In this interim report we present the results of the first task of Workpackage 3 (WP3) of the 
EU-financed project 'The Development of Ethical Bio-Technology Assessment Tools for 
Agriculture and Food Production' (QLG6-CT-2002-02594) The purpose of WP3 is to ex-
plore ethical benchmarking in order to develop a set of tools that can help to integrate 
ethics in food chain management. The focus of the tools is to facilitate moral communica-
tion between economic actors in the food chain and between these food chain actors and 
consumers in order to gain trustworthiness.  
In this task we describe stepping-stones and existing tools that will help us to evaluate, de-
velop and apply our tools. Therefore, we elaborate in section 4.2 of this report on the 
contents of our task. In that section we answer the questions: 
 
- Why is moral communication in the food chain necessary? 
- What is moral communication? 
- What kind of tools do we need? 
 
 
 This section learns us that three stages in moral communication need to be distin-
guished: 1) expression and exchange of values of those involved, 2) serious attempt to 
understand the other's positions and perspectives, and 3) communication itself. 
 Based upon this analysis of moral communication, we describe in section 4.3 the 
stepping-stones that are meant to provide ingredients for these different tools. In the re-
mainder of the report we will not describe these stepping-stones one by one, but we will try 
to synthesise them in four sections: 
 
- A section on language and metaphors (4.4); 
- A section on the food system as co-operative practice and as competitive market 
(4.5); 
- A chapter on existing tools and stakeholder theory (4.6). 
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 During our research project we have come to realise how difficult it is to get good 
case descriptions. In-depth interviews and discussion with the responsible people in the 
cases to be studied, and the discussion at the third consortium meeting in Utrecht, taught us 
that we have to change our plans. Instead of two in-depth case studies it is better – based 
upon this inventory - to interview several possible tool users with regard to their needs. We 
expect that this will lead to a much better practical fit between our stepping-stones and the 
reality of the food chain.  
 
 
4.2 Moral Communication in the Food Chain. Why and How? 
 
We start this section with a short description of the problems in the food sector that raise 
the need for enhancing moral communication in the food chain. After this description, we 
shortly elaborate on the idea of moral communication. Based upon these two introductory 
sections we sketch an outline of the contents of our tools for facilitating moral communica-
tion. We end this section with conclusions about the general focus of our work package.  
 
The problem at hand 
During the last decades governmental policy in the field of agriculture and food in Western 
countries aimed at providing enough and safe food. That emphasis has reached a point 
where a tension appeared between striving for more efficiency in food production on the 
one hand and satisfying the concerns about food quality and sustainability on the other 
hand. At the same time - and as a result of growing agricultural efficiency and urbanisation 
- the physical and mental distance between food production and consumption has grown. 
Consumers have - generally spoken - a romantic picture of food production that is often re-
enforced by food marketing. When - mostly in situations of food crises - they are con-
fronted with the reality of food production, they will feel alienated. This situation leads to 
problems such as distrust. The technological, economic and scientific approach to food and 
food safety seems out of touch with the role of food in people's life world. The problems 
with consumer concerns and political resistance against the introduction of biotechnology 
in agriculture and food production in Europe can be placed against this background. 
 The problematic discussions about food biotechnology therefore show a larger prob-
lem with regard to the relation between the food sector and society. A mental gap has risen 
that asks for more than the management of public and consumer relations. It is widely ac-
knowledged that in order to bridge this gap it is necessary that the food sector opens up; 
transparency and traceability are keywords in the food sector at the moment.  
 Transparency, however, is in itself not enough. It is clear a) that just showing what 
you do in itself does not solve the problem, and b) that you cannot show everything to eve-
rybody. The same holds true for traceability. Which properties of food production should 
be traceable? Origin, production method, environmental consequences of the production, 
and/or labour circumstances? Transparency and traceability presuppose clarity about the 
importance of what has to be shown and what has to be traceable. Possible answers to 
these questions depend - of course - partly upon what is practically feasible. Answering 
these questions depends also upon value decisions. It is clear that in practice the discus-
sions about feasibility and values are intertwined. The more important you think something 
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is, the more effort you will be prepared to invest in it and, therefore, the more feasible it 
becomes. The values involved in these discussions about transparency and traceability are 
embedded in broader systems.  
 It is not self-evident that different actors in the food chain have a shared system of 
values. It is also not self-evident that such a shared system is feasible. In order to find out 
whether it is desirable and possible to develop a shared system, communication about these 
values is necessary. Communication about these values, their importance and their conse-
quences for practical matters in the food chain, however, is not without problems. It seems 
that businesses (corporations/firms) have limited experience with value communication. 
Instruments to facilitate this communication are needed. It is the purpose of this work pac-
kage to develop tools that can facilitate this communication. 
 
Moral communication 
In this project we would like to integrate ethics in food chain management by facilitating 
moral communication between the different stakeholders in the food chain. In order to 
identify the different stepping-stones to be used and to make a further inventory of tools in 
use, it is important to have a grip on the idea of 'moral communication'. This concept has 
been elaborated in the discussion about education with regard to values and morals in a 
pluralistic society. One of the influential authors in this field is Van der Ven. In his book 
on the Formation of the Moral Self he defines (1998, 31) 'moral communication as the on-
going process of moral exchange and understanding in the search of truth'. 
 He elaborates on the three keywords of this definition: moral exchange, understand-
ing and truth as follows: 
 
- 'Moral exchange means mutually expressing moral beliefs, principles, values, and 
norms, while also seeking to clarify, explain, and justify them'. From this we learn 
that moral communication does not only involve expressing moral points of view but 
also involves seeking to justify them. We not only express, e.g., that we think that 
animal welfare is an important value in our livestock production but we also give 
reasons why we think so. 
- 'Moral understanding is the adopting of another's perspective and heeding another's 
clarifications, explanations, and justifications. It involves adopting, at least temporar-
ily, and taking into account the individual and social history out of which these 
emerge'. In moral communication we are not only in the business of expressing and 
justifying a certain value but we also try to understand the other and his or her point 
of view. For instance, if someone expresses doubts about the importance of a certain 
environment-friendly production system, we would need to understand the back-
ground (e.g. an economic perspective and the importance of job security) of this 
view. 
- 'This moral exchange and understanding is part of the search for truth, the search for 
what is good and just so that one may act with wisdom in all of life's situations'. We 
not only exchange views and try to understand each other because we would like to 
reach practical agreements, but also because we think that - although we accept all 
difficulties with regard to the criteria - certain behaviour is morally right and other is 
definitely wrong. Nowadays, an easy example would be the use of slavery in agricul-
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tural practice. When we agree that one is justified in calling certain working circum-
stances slavery, we not only agree that these situations are unacceptable but also 
think that we agree rightly so. 
 
 With this definition the problem of understanding moral communication is not solved 
but only introduced as a topic of discussion. Especially 'truth' as the goal of moral 
communication raises several questions. An analysis of these questions is - for the 
development of practical tools - not very helpful. For our project it is of importance to see 
that moral communication is not solely directed at understanding each other's position but 
also at mutual amelioration of the values at hand. Moral communication can entail critical 
scrutiny of one another's values. For this it is important to distinguish between two 
different levels of moral communication: a first order moral communication that is 
characterised by plausibility, and a second order communication that is characterised by 
justification.   In first order communication the 'perceptions, experiences, images, metaphors, sym-
bols, stories, convictions, principles, values, and norms that are dealt with and exchanged 
(…) are taken as self-evident, reasonable, understandable. They need not to be discussed or 
proved' (Van der Ven 1999, 32). In first order communication the values, norms and meta-
phors are accepted as plausible. They have two important features: their core contents are 
taken to be self-evident and their guidance is not contested. People act upon them and they 
take direction, inspiration and guidance from them. In first order communication not the 
values, principles, etc. as such are at stake but questions with regard to their applicability in 
certain practical situations. 
 'Second-order communication also is characterized by narration and argument, but 
the stories that are told and the arguments that are used, are intended to evoke discussion, 
to break through the boundaries, the walls, of the common life-world. Questions are not 
meant to elicit further clarification and enrichment or deeper understanding, but to call into 
question the traditional rules, values and norms' (Van der Ven 1999, 33v). Second-order 
moral communication is about moral conflicts. Practises, norms or ideals that were ac-
cepted once are challenged now. In the food chain, second order communication often 
starts when generally accepted practices within the food chain are questioned and chal-
lenged by NGOs and when significant numbers of consumers support these questions by 
raising 'consumer concerns'. 
 From this short analysis we learn three things that are important for the development 
of our tools: 
 
- Moral communication entails the expression and exchange of values of those in-
volved; 
- Moral communication entails serious attempts to understand the other's position and 
perspective; 
- It is important to distinguish between moral communication about a) plausible and 
therefore shared perspectives and b) divergent and therefore challenged perspectives. 
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Developing a tool 
The objective of our work package is to link food chain management and ethics in order to 
enable the stakeholders to deal adequately with ethical issues in the food chain. For that 
purpose we will develop a set of tools that can be instrumental for critical reflection. The 
typical tool will not be a checklist for companies to inspect their values, nor will it simply 
be a recipe for satisfactorily answering complaints from environmental, consumer or ani-
mal welfare groups. The tools, instead, will be of three kinds: 
 
- Tools for value clarification (within firms). Clarifying one's own values is a first step 
towards moral communication and a first phase of the communication itself. For the 
first tool one can think of lists of interconnected questions with building blocks for 
possible answers. These building blocks enable organisations in the food production 
system to formulate positions and clarify the value decisions they routinely make.  
- Tools for improving the understanding of the positions of others (other firms, con-
sumers and NGOs). Answers of individual actors within the food chain, however, are 
not enough. Firstly, the interdependence within the food chain extends into the field 
of value judgements: decisions made in one place in the food chain limit the deci-
sional space of others. In order to provide transparency and traceability in the food 
chain with regard to these value judgements moral communication within the chain 
is necessary. It is therefore necessary to provide tools that help to understand the po-
sition and perspective of the other actors in the chain. Secondly, providing 
transparency and traceability presupposes an understanding of towards whom a firm 
would like to be transparent. Therefore, the tool should also improve the understand-
ing of the positions of the citizen-consumer and NGOs. Here we think of a typology 
of systematic positions in which different value judgements are merged into more or 
less systematised pictures. This overview of ideal-types helps to understand the pos-
sible positions of others. 
- Tools to characterise differences of opinion and suitable communication strategies 
with regard to these differences. The third kind of tool is needed to help actors to dis-
tinguish between 'a) plausible and therefore shared perspectives and b) different and 
therefore challenged perspectives'. Here we think of a tool that consists of a charac-
terisation of different moral conflicts and suitable coping systems. For this we think 
of process-oriented tools that create and structure discussion arenas.  
 
 
 Thus the work package will deliver instruments that enable actors in the food chain 
to a) formulate their own answers to the relevant questions, b) understand the answers of 
others, and c) start communication that is in line with the kind of emergent problem. 
 
Conclusions 
The main conclusions that we draw from this analysis of moral communication and its con-
text is that for facilitating moral communication in the food chain: 
 
- the emphasis should not be on a possible result, like trust or trustworthiness, but on 
the processes of moral communication;  
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- it is important to distinguish different stages of moral communication (self-
clarification, understanding the other, comparison and communication), because 
from each stage follow different requirements for the tools; 
- it is important to recognise that communication is not only build upon conceptual 
skills but that social skills are equally important and that we need to address the im-
portance of these social skills. 
 
 
4.3 A Systematic Presentation of the Stepping-Stones in the Report 
 
The stepping-stones analysed in this report are meant to provide ingredients for different 
tools. They consist of different elements that might be helpful for their further development 
of our toolbox. Some of these stepping-stones already have a direct link with the issues at 
hand in moral communication within the food chain. Other stepping-stones, however, have 
a much more distant relation to the issue of moral communication. According to us, a wide 
variety of possible stepping-stones is needed, since the problem at hand is relatively new. 
We hope to benefit from a broad inventory of possible inputs from diverse discussions and 
backgrounds.  
 For the selection of stepping-stones we have distinguished four different leading 
questions with regard to the food chain. The answers to these questions were used to clus-
ter groups of items that might function as stepping-stones. In this interim report we limit 
ourselves to the description of these items. In the next task we will decide what possible 
stepping-stones do really help us in developing our tools. 
 
Which concepts help us to understand the relation identity-communication in the food 
chain? 
- Description and analysis of discussions about the use of images and metaphors and 
their importance for conceptualising and managing ethical issues in food chain 
and/or business contexts, including images and descriptions of ethically ideal chains.  
- A brief analysis of theories about identity with special attention for the concept of 
narrative identity. Application of these theories to the identity of organisations (e.g. 
firms). 
 
 From these stepping-stones we expect to gain insight in the (symbolic) representation 
in and of the chain and the relevance of these (symbolic) representations for real life 
communication. 
 
What is the context in which the tools have to function? 
- Here we think of three kinds of stepping-stones that might be relevant: 
- Description and analysis of discussions with regard to the concept of 'practice' and of 
practice-inherent moral norms and values, with a special emphasis on the relations 
between different practices in a pluralistic society. 
- Description and analysis of (descriptive and normative) stakeholder theories with re-
gard to the role of implicit and explicit negotiations with stakeholders and the 
justifying role that stakeholder consultation can and cannot fulfil. 
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- Analysis of the relation between citizens and consumers, the relation between civil 
society and market. 
 
 From these stepping stones we expect a) insight in the societal and economic con-
texts in which the food chain has to operate, b) an overview of the discussions about the 
way responsibilities are assigned in these contexts, and c) material to evaluate existing 
tools from the perspective of the consequences of these contexts for the application of the 
tools. 
 
Which moral concepts already play an important role in food-chain-debates? 
- Analysis of the concept of trust, especially of the difference between anticipatory and 
responsive trust and the relation of trust with traceability, transparency and responsi-
bility  
- Analysis of the concept of responsibility, especially of responsibility for the vulner-
able entrusted to us and of the distinction between minimal and ideal responsibility.  
- Analysis of the concept of care and its role for relations, departing from the discus-
sions within the ethics of care. 
 
 From these stepping-stones we expect to gain insight in why, where and how ethics 
can be introduced in food chain management. 
 
Which tools are already in place in business and business ethics? 
- Description and analysis of benchmarking (A systematic process for securing con-
tinuous improvement through comparison with relevant and achievable internal 
norms or standards). Benchmarking is a management tool already in use in both pub-
lic and private sector organisations and it is all about change, moving from one 
position to a better position. 
- Description and analysis of standards and protocols for ethics and values in busi-
nesses. Literature on business ethics and corporate social performance in general, 
with special attention to a) the development and evaluation of standards and codes, 
and b) process-oriented approaches. 
 
 From these steppingstones we expect an inventory of possible processes of stan-
dardization of non-quantifiable elements of production, explicit reflection on strengths and 
weaknesses of standardization and an overview of 'ethical standards' already in use. 
 
Describing these stepping stones 
In the remainder of the report we will not describe these stepping-stones one by one but we 
will try to synthesise them in four chapters. In the next section (4.4) we will focus on the 
ways in which identity, image and metaphors play a role in the first two stages of moral 
communication (self-clarification and understanding the others). Organizations cannot al-
ways 'just' make a list of the values they hold. Their values are often held implicitly and are 
embedded in the way that they express their identity. Also the perceived values of other 
organizations can sometimes be traced through the indirect way of analysing metaphors 
used to describe these organizations. 
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For facilitating moral communication in the food sector it is important to distinguish be-
tween 1) the food sector as a co-operative practice in which different parties work together, 
and 2) the food sector as a competitive market in which companies operate as rivals. In 
section 4.5 we explore these differences and we learn that both create different opportuni-
ties and challenges for moral communication in the food chain. In the first context moral 
communication can build on existing co-operation, in the second it needs to acknowledge 
the possibility of 'ethics' being used as a strategic devise. Trademarks, ethical labels and 
the like can be seen as instruments of companies for responding to consumer concerns in 
the market and function- at least partly - as tools to gain larger or specific lucrative mar-
kets. 
 The focus of our tools is to facilitate moral communication between economic actors 
in the food chain and between the food chain and the consumers in order to gain trustwor-
thiness. For our work package it is therefore important to have a more precise 
understanding of the different ideas and concepts that are related to trust and trustworthi-
ness. In section 4.6 we analyse trust, trustworthiness, responsibility and care. This analysis 
will give us insights that are important for the evaluation of the tools that are already avail-
able. 
 In the last section (4.7) we give a systematic presentation of eleven tools that are in 
use. We think that these eleven tools, together with some of the tools described in WP1 
(like the ethical matrix), will help us in completing our set of tools. Each of these tools is 
described in more detail in the annex. The tools that we found can be grouped under five 
headings. We found tools for: 1) ethical exploration, 2) ethical decision-making, 3) ethical 
identity expression, 4) management of change, and 5) stakeholder dialogue. Stakeholder 
dialogue seems for our project a very important tool. Therefore, we give special attention 
to stakeholder theory as its background. We focus on the unsolved problems within this 
theory, not to discredit stakeholder dialogue but to show which problems we need to tackle 
in the next - evaluative - task. 
 
 
4.4 Values Embedded in Identity, Imago and Metaphors 
 
In the first two stages of moral communication (self-clarification and understanding the 
others) one cannot always 'just' make a list of the values one holds. The values organisa-
tions hold implicitly are often embedded in the way that they express their identity, and the 
perceived values of other organisations can sometimes be traced through the indirect way 
of analysing metaphors used to describe these organisations.  
 
Identity and Imago 
One can understand 'corporate identity' as the sum of it's values. Corporate identity is inter-
twined but not identical with corporate image. The latter refers to how firms are perceived, 
while the former refers to how or who a firm was, is and would like to be. Nevertheless, re-
flection on identity is often stimulated by reflection on image. 
 Image is important for companies. It has - as a marketing issue - gained enormous 
importance in the 1980s in conjunction with the idea that successful corporations should 
not primarily produce things or products but brands. What a company produces in the first 
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place came to be seen as images: brand image was what counted. Consequently, image 
management became an issue of the highest corporate relevance. Image includes not only 
visual aspects of brands, such as logos, but also the values, lifestyles and emotions associ-
ated with the brand. The aspirations of brand imaging, however, have been expanded. 
Brands came to be sources of meaning and identity, acquired spiritual dimensions.  
 Focusing solely on brand image becomes problematic, when an image is not linked 
with reality any longer, e.g. unpleasant realities about production circumstances. The prob-
lem for firms is that this gap will inevitably backfire. Image management, therefore, cannot 
easily be separated from corporate identity.  
 A way to understand human identity is to consider it as narrative identity. Narrative 
identity is an attempt to grasp reality in a comprehensive way. Living amidst potential 
chaos, people create unity, meaning, purpose and direction through narrative devices in an 
essentially historical, story-like way. Johnson (in his book Moral Imagination) takes narra-
tives in a broad and metaphorical sense. Narrative is not only linguistic storytelling. Life 
itself is lived in a narrative way, i.e. people live their lives in a story-like way, with the 
help of narrative explanations that construct unity as well as direction. Narrative identity 
relates persons to their past and future as well as to their social and material environment. 
It is therefore not only a historical but also an ecological concept. Understanding these nar-
ratives, in turn, leads us to frames, plots, metaphors and other imaginative devices. We are 
thus directed to the importance of metaphors for corporate identity in two ways: 
- Thoughts about companies are (sometimes, often, always?) metaphorical. Companies 
can be seen as persons but one can also think about companies in terms of machines 
or biological organisms; 
- Contemporary thinking about identity stresses its narrative character and metaphor is 
a crucial element in understanding narrative. When we would like to understand the 
values embedded in a company's identity, deconstructing its narratives – its meta-
phors - might help to express these values. 
 
Metaphors 
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999) the embodied character of the mind explains why 
conceptual thought is largely metaphorical. As children, we learn to think in specific situa-
tions, in which we equate affection with warmth, importance with bigness, etc. Growing 
up, these associations turn into what the authors call 'primary metaphors', which are gradu-
ally combined to form the complex metaphorical structures in which mature conceptual 
thought takes place. The mechanism is always a movement to understand the unfamiliar 
with the help of the familiar.  
 Schön (1979) argues that while designing social policy is often seen as a problem 
solving activity, the setting of the problem is in fact more important. Problem setting can 
be clarified by listening to stories that people tell about situations. Because stories are spe-
cific, they preserve more of the richness of situations than theory (they are comprehensive 
devices to deal with reality). The framing of stories is often based on underlying meta-
phors, which Schön calls generative metaphors because they generate explanations, 
observations and problem solutions. He emphasises that many conflicts cannot be solved 
through the collection of new data, because they are caused by different metaphorical 
framings that give relevance to different kinds of data. This shows the importance of un-
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derstanding the metaphorical structure of discourse in order to be able to understand the 
positions of those with whom one would like to communicate.  
 In business management the ideas about the role of images, metaphors have been 
elaborated by Morgan (Images of Organization, 1986 & Imaginization, 1997). He ex-
presses the idea that all theory, including theory about organisation and management, is 
based on metaphors. In Images of Organization he presented six different metaphors of or-
ganisations, including machines and organisms. Each of these metaphors highlights as well 
as hides its own specific aspects of organisations. Managers should avoid superficial man-
agement fads by using the different metaphors wisely and creatively. In Imaginization he 
uses metaphors as creative devices in order to start reflection about organisational identity. 
According to him managers should become skilled in the art of using metaphors to find 
'new ways of seeing, understanding, and shaping their actions.'  
 Awareness of metaphors clearly can be put to different uses. Metaphors generate 
frames of thought, and elucidating them therefore elucidates our thoughts about an issue. 
Metaphors guide the search for solutions to problems. But awareness of the metaphors or-
ganising our thought also implies awareness of possible alternatives. When we look for 
fresh alternatives through the pursuit of new metaphors, they become devices to facilitate 
creative processes. In short, on the basis of an awareness of metaphors different tools can 
be constructed, which are not mutually exclusive: tools to clarify frames of thought, to look 
for alternatives, to guide the exploration of an issue. For the present work package, their 
usefulness for thinking about corporate identity in relation to corporate ethics is the crite-
rion. 
 
Conclusion 
With regard to the different tools that we would like to develop we can conclude from this 
analysis of identity, imago and metaphors that for self-clarification and understanding the 
others: 
- The role of real and perceived identities is important. The work package needs tools 
to construct and deconstruct identity and imago; 
- The role of language and the way positions are framed are important. The work 
package needs tools to disclose the role of metaphors and frames in shaping identi-
ties. 
 
 
4.5 The Food Chain as Co-operative Practice and Competitive Market  
 
For facilitating moral communication in the food sector its structure and the way different 
actors relate to each other are important. In this perspective the food sector has two differ-
ent faces that require different tools for moral communication. On the one hand, different 
parties work together in the food sector. They have common standards and common goals 
(like food safety). For facilitating moral communication one should take these common 
practices as point of departure. An analysis of the food sector as a 'practice' could therefore 
provide us with stepping-stones for our work package. On the other hand, the food sector is 
a market in which companies operate as rivals. Ethics is in this market used as a strategic 
device. Trademarks, ethical labels and the like are instruments of companies for respond-
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ing to consumer concerns in the market and function - at least partly - as tools to gain 
larger or specific lucrative markets. For facilitating ethical communication in the food sec-
tor it is therefore also important to have a good insight in market positions in the food 
market and of the role of consumer concerns on this market. For facilitating moral com-
munication we need to have more insight in the role that ethics plays on the market. An 
analysis of food as not just a commodity and of consumer concerns will therefore also pro-
vide us with stepping-stones for our work package. 
 
Practices in a Pluralist Context 
In order to improve our understanding of the co-operative activities in the food chain it 
might be helpful to use the concept of practice. The central idea is that human activities 
take place in a social context. There is a difference between cutting someone with a knife 
in a medical context and in a fight. The 'same' action is different, because of the differences 
in context. One way of understanding this difference is by focusing at the organisational 
principles that form the basis of the contexts in which these activities take place. The un-
derlying principles of fighting are different from the underlying principles of medicine. In 
order to get a better grip on these organisational principles the concept of practice has been 
used. 
 Being embedded in different practices makes the 'same' action different. In order to 
get a better grip on this concept of 'practice' we start with a definition of practice by Alis-
dair MacIntyre. His definition seems helpful for elaborating on the different problems in 
trying to understand the food sector as a practice.1 In After Virtue (1984, 187) MacIntyre 
defines a practice as follows: 'By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex 
form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excel-
lence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. 
Tic-tac-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with 
skill; but the game of football is and so is chess.' In the definition of MacIntyre we find 
three important elements: 
 
- He describes a practice as a coherent and complex form of socially established co-
operative human activity. The problem created with this part of the definition is to 
distinguish one practice from an other. The question is which activities we take to-
gether as a coherent and complex form, which level of abstraction we want and 
where we draw the line between activities that belong to one form and to an other. 
- Their internal goods characterise practices. For science as a practice he proposes 
truth as an internal good and for medicine human health. One could defend that food 
safety and food security are the internal goods of the food practice. In the interviews 
with the different stakeholders in the next task we have to find out whether this is 
really the case. These internal goods are distinguished from external goods. External 
goods are necessary means in order to keep the practice going (like money, jobs and 
buildings) and in that sense very important. However, they are not relevant for un-
                                                 
1 Different ways of defining a practice prevail. For our workpackage it does not seem to be necessary to 
dwell into these different definitions. We use the definition of MacIntyre in order to elaborate on some of the 
tensions intrinsic to the use of the concept of practice. 
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derstanding what the practice is all about. They are of course important because they 
shape the context of the practice. An important characteristic of the internal goods of 
a practice is that they are necessarily contested. Some discussion about the character 
and relation between the different internal goods of a practice always exists (What is 
truth, health or food safety? What is the relation between consumers' risk perceptions 
and scientific risks? Do countries need an own agriculture to establish food security 
or is food security a global good?).  
- From the internal goods of a practice follow standards of excellence in order to as-
sess the adequacy of different activities. Since practices are oriented at internal 
goods, they are necessarily normative in the sense that different activities are better 
or worse directed at these internal goods. In order to assess the different activities 
standards of excellence are available. In a well-functioning practice performance ac-
cording to these standards of excellence is a dominant denominator for the 
distribution of the external goods. A practice functions well when the performance 
according to the standards of excellence plays a dominant role in the distribution of, 
e.g., money and jobs. 
 
 A question to be addressed in the following tasks of our work package is in what way 
the concept of practice is helpful in understanding the food sector. On the one hand, one 
can see food safety and food security as internal goods of the food sector. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the links in the food chain are – not yet – integrated in a way that en-
ables them to be understood as a coherent and complex form of socially established, co-
operative human activity. Coherence and co-operation between the different links seems 
primarily organised through external goods (money) and not through common standards of 
excellence. A lot of money is involved in the food sector, it operates on a huge market. Ac-
cording to the Worldbank (Diaz-Bonilla & Thomas 2003: 233) the top 20 of food exporters 
together export for 80.26 billion US$ a year.  
 
Food: Not Just a Commodity  
Because food is an important economic commodity our tools need to acknowledge this 
market reality. However, one of the specific aspects of the food market is that we cannot 
regard food purchasing as just an economic activity. Among the stepping-stones for our 
tools we need elements that address the issue that food is not just a commodity.  
 Food is special because it is important for maintaining our lives, without food we die. 
This is of relevance because up until recently in affluent countries and still in great parts of 
the world food is scarce. Food chain ethics cannot neglect the fact that massive under nour-
ishment prevails across the globe. FAO estimates at this moment that some 800 million 
people are undernourished.  
 Food is also special because it is strongly linked with our cultural and individual 
value systems. What we think of acceptable food products - the distinction between the 
edible and the inedible - is strongly related to our religious and cultural worldviews. The 
distinction is not just based on what our bodies can digest - think of eating insects, cats, 
dogs or horses - nor do we treat food as just getting sufficient nutrients. The social and cul-
tural meanings of food preparation, of sharing food and of the way that food is part of our 
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communication patrons, is a study in itself. The consumption of food plays a role in our 
collective and personal identity building. 
 The fact that food is special has direct consequences for the way that ethics relates to 
food markets. Consumers formulate certain 'moral concerns' with regard to food produc-
tion and one of the ways that food companies respond to these concerns is by labelling 
certain products as animal friendly, organic, natural, etc.  
 In our work package we need to elaborate on the relation between consumer con-
cerns and ethical labelling. Therefore, we analyse in this task the concept of consumer 
concerns. The complexity of this concept will become clear, if we take a closer look at the 
different concerns that consumers voice on the food market: 
 
- Concerns that matter to all consumers. Certain consumer concerns matter equally to 
everybody in their role as consumers. Food safety is a key issue in this field. Food 
safety is important to all consumers and it is clear that food safety issues ask for a 
governmental response. It is beyond the possibilities of individual consumers to as-
sess these questions (Rippe, 1999). Here we see that a certain consumer concern calls 
for activities of citizens in order to handle their concerns. 
- Concerns that matter to specific groups of consumers. Other consumer concerns mat-
ter to special groups of consumers, because of the way they want to live their lives. It 
is important for citizens to be able to live according to their own life plan. Respect 
for their autonomy implies that they have the prima facie right to live their life ac-
cording to their own value system. Their right to live according to their own life plan 
implies that they ought to have the choice for products that fit in with their view of 
life. Vegetarians, for instance, can only live according to their own value system 
when they know whether or not their food contains animal products. In so far as 
vegetarianism is a lifestyle we see that personal values enter the market. If vegetari-
anism transcends lifestyle and is a moral choice that appeals to others, it will go 
beyond consumer concerns.  
- Concerns that go beyond consumer concerns. Finally, concerns are articulated on the 
market that find their origin in the role people have as citizens. These concerns are 
related to ideas about a good society. These concerns are not 'consumer concerns' in 
a technical sense; they are public concerns. People are concerned about certain prod-
ucts because of the wider impact of these products on their society and the world. 
Take, as an example, meat that is produced by crated calves. People are against this 
way of producing meat, not just because they do not want to eat meat produced by 
crated calves but also because they think that the way crated calves are treated is 
immoral and should be banned. Crating calves is problematic because it is not com-
patible with a good society. Here we see how civic values enter the market. 
 
 
 In developing our tools we need to take into account the distinction between con-
sumers and citizens and the link between both roles as shown in the analysis of consumer 
concerns. We also need to look at how food companies respond to these concerns, e.g. in 
so-called ethical labelling. 
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Conclusion 
With regard to the different tools that we would like to develop we can conclude from this 
analysis of the food chain as a co-operative practice and of food as a special commodity in 
a competitive market that for facilitating moral communication: 
- The co-operation of actors in the food chain as a common practice with more or less 
shared standards on food safety and food security is an important point of departure 
for developing communicative ethical tools;  
- The role of ethical standards, labels and trademarks as answers to consumer concerns 
and as competitive instruments calls for tools that facilitate a process of fair compari-
son of different standards in competitive markets.  
 
 
4.6 Trust, Responsibility and Care 
 
The focus of our tools is to facilitate moral communication between economic actors in the 
food chain and between the food chain and consumers in order to gain trustworthiness. We 
concluded at the end of section 4.2 that the emphasis of our work package should not be on 
a possible result of moral communication, like trust or trustworthiness, but on its processes. 
Nevertheless, it could be helpful for designing our communicative tools to have a more 
specific understanding of the different ideas and concepts that are related to trust and 
trustworthiness. The analysis of these concepts does not directly contribute to description 
of our tools but it will give us some insights that might be important in the evaluation of 
the tools that are already available. 
 
Trust1 
In trying to define the concept of trust the diversity of definitions is striking. Like Hardin 
(1993, 2000) we can define trust as embedded interest in the sense that you will trust 
someone, if you have sufficient reason to believe that it is in that person's interest to be 
trustworthy. Trust is embedded in one's judgement of the interests of the trusted. The basic 
premises of this rational choice approach are that both the trustier and the trustee are ra-
tional agents and that trust is a form of rational calculation based upon available 
information. Since trust becomes crucial in situations of risk or uncertainty, trust is seen in 
this approach as rational risk calculation. In this process of rational calculation both the 
trustier and the trustee aim to maximise their interests.  
 But is trust always a matter of rational considerations and interests? Lahno (2001) 
convincingly argues that genuine trust has an emotional character that goes beyond the di-
rect control of reason. He states that a focus on rationality does not suffice for enlightening 
the concept of trust. Trust is more than accepting a certain risk, in the sense that we decide 
to trust after having weighed all risks and benefits. This does not imply that trust is a com-
pletely intangible concept that lacks any relation to reflective deliberation and reason. Yet, 
it means that trust is not merely influenced by the risks and benefits in the surrounding 
world around. Trust itself colours our perception of that world. Trusting has a double direc-
                                                 
1 We thank Franck Meijboom for his valuable comments and for the use of texts from other projects on trust 
in agro-ethics. 
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tion: although rational analysis of risk and uncertainty plays an important role in the proc-
ess of trusting, trust is not something that is decided with a calculator on our desk. 
Understanding trust as an emotional attitude elucidates that trust colours the information 
we get about risks and uncertainties. Our perception of the information that we receive is 
highly influenced by the presence or absence of trust, e.g. someone who trusts the food 
sector will probably perceive a large-scale recall of a product by a food company as a con-
firmation of his trust. On the other hand, someone who lacks such trust in the sector will 
presumably have the idea just to have escaped from another food crisis. 
 In short, speaking about trust implies speaking about relations. Trust is never a kind 
of static noun that can be separated from trust relations. Further, in speaking about trust we 
cannot ignore the emotional character of trust. Knowledge and control are both issues that 
are important with respect to trusting relations. However, by reducing trust to a problem of 
knowledge and control or power we tend to eliminate trust (Becker, 1996). Trust is not 
only a matter of risk reducing, it enables us to deal with risks and uncertainty.  
 To prevent that trust becomes a catch-all concept that will be next to meaningless, it 
is wise to differentiate between different types of trust (see: Sztompka 1999; Hollis 1998). 
We may distinguish at least two general types of trust: anticipatory trust and responsive 
trust1.  
 Anticipatory trust. Anticipatory trust is the kind of trust in which one trusts the other 
since one expects him or her to act routinely. It is the normal pattern of behaviour that 
forms both the starting point and the ground for trust. The main element in the (implicit) 
decision to trust is the analogy between this case and former cases in which the other has 
acted in a trustworthy way. Precondition for this type of trust is that a kind of predictive 
pattern exists. This might also be based upon the sum of different events and different ac-
tors with a same result. When I have never buyed decayed food in a supermarket, I will 
also buy food in a supermarket that I do not know at all. In that case I will trust that the 
food quality in this supermarket is like everywhere else.  
 Responsive trust. In many situations in the agro-food sector the normal pattern does 
not suffice as ground for trusting relations or a normal pattern is absent. With the introduc-
tion of a new technology in food production, for instance, we have to trust others that the 
products of that technology are safe and meet certain standards of quality. However, in 
such a situation we cannot rely on the usual way of dealing with these products, since no 
normal pattern concerning this new technology is established. In such cases we may better 
speak about responsive trust. With responsive trust we do not expect the other to act along 
the normal pattern but we expect the other to be responsible in his or her acting with re-
spect to the object entrusted to him or her. The other should not merely do the usual but 
should do what is right, i.e. should do what may be expected of him or her in moral terms. 
This implies some extra responsibility. Shared values and shared moral understandings - 
and the expectation that the other will act in accordance with them - are the ground of this 
kind trust.  
 Anticipatory trust presupposes predictability, responsive trust presupposes shared 
values. For anticipatory trust transparency and traceability seem to be enough. Responsive 
                                                 
1 Sztompka (1999; 27-29) also speaks about evocative trust. This type is, however, not very illuminating in 
the field of agriculture and food. See also Hollis (1998, 10-11), who distinguishes predictive trust (trust the 
other to do the same as usual) and normative trust (trust the other to do what is right). 
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trust, however, remains problematic and vulnerable as long as it is not clear what the im-
plications of the shared values are. Therefore, responsive trust is not only a matter of 
transparency concerning the values at stake but also implies a discussion on how these 
shared values are applied in relation to the object of trust. Responsive trust asks for moral 
communication. 
 For the food chain this means, among other things, that giving information does not 
necessarily generate trust, since the presence or absence of trust partly determines how in-
formation is conceived. Traceability might be important for the 'rational choice' aspect of 
trust but it does not say much without being linked to values. Transparency should also in-
clude transparency of aims and values and how these values are translated into norms. The 
best way to make trust in others possible is by becoming trustworthy. In order to be trust-
worthy it is necessary to know and communicate about one's responsibilities.  
 
Moral responsibility 
Responsibility is a frequently used concept in daily language. Hundreds of books and arti-
cles have been written about responsibility and the concept appears in political, societal 
and even personal discussions on a daily basis. Whether it is about the responsibility of the 
physician or government, the responsibility for safe food or healthy nutrition, or responsi-
bility as an educational aim, the public has a general understanding of how the concept of 
responsibility is used in a given context. While discussions usually address the content of 
responsibility in a specific situation, the concept itself is rarely defined. Despite our fre-
quent use and understanding of the concept, it is not an easy task to define it in an abstract 
way.1 
 Let us therefore start by exploring the contrasting concepts of 'being responsible'. 
Someone is 'not responsible' when he is (as yet) lacking the capability for being responsi-
ble, e.g. an infant. Someone is also 'not responsible' when he is not in the situation to 
influence what is happening. Then, someone else might take the responsibility. 'Being re-
sponsible' can also be contrasted with 'being irresponsible'. In that case, someone is 
capable of responsibility and is, up to a certain degree, able to influence a situation but 
does not (rightly)do so and he is blamed for that (De Beaufort 1992). Responsibility and 
the contrasting concepts refer to moral responsibility. Moral responsibility can be assigned 
to people (by themselves or others) having the necessary capabilities. It means that a 
responsible person is morally accountable for his choices and can pro- or retrospectively 
give good reasons for them. Responsibility comes is related to power and vulnerability: a 
choice between different actions is available and this choice matters to others. 
 Moral responsibility is linked with one's behavioural choices. This holds in two dif-
ferent ways. First, from the perspective of reactive responsibility the point of departure is a 
certain (mostly undesirable) state of affairs. Then the question is asked what a certain actor 
(P) has done in order to determine whether that actor can be held morally responsible (and 
thus blamed) for what has happened. Second, from the perspective of prospective respon-
sibility the point of departure is the actor (P) feeling responsible for bringing about 
something. That felt responsibility determines the actor's behaviour, which in turn results 
in a certain state of affairs. The concepts of retro- and prospective responsibility differ in 
                                                 
1 We will not dwell into the philosophical discussion about responsibility and free will.  
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point of departure (from the actor or from a situation), direction (responsibility ascribed af-
ter something happened or responsibility taken to strive for something) and perspective 
(responsibility ascribed from the outside or by the actor himself). While these distinctions 
are theoretically illuminating, in practice both concepts are intertwined. What one accepts 
as one's prospective responsibility might be linked to one's calculation of whether one will 
be blamed or not.  
 Responsibility is not only a question of perspective but also of standards. This is of 
specific importance for our tools. Standards of responsibility probably differ among actors 
in the food chain. On the one hand, some scholars defend that actors only need to take their 
minimal responsibility. With minimal responsibility acting responsibly means sticking to 
the minimal standards that are set by some social environment, e.g. the government. One 
does what minimally can be expected from the outside and is accountable in case of not 
living up to these standards. Taking one's minimal responsibility is a necessary (first) step 
in being a trustworthy partner in social (or business) life. However, taking up one's mini-
mal responsibility only generates predictability of one's behaviour - one can be expected to 
do what accepted standards proscribe - and therefore only generates anticipatory trust. The 
problem, however, in a changing food chain is that in order to be trustworthy one needs not 
only to be predictable but also responsive.  
 Being responsive might be understood as taking up more than minimal responsibil-
ity. In this context the idea of ideal responsibility might be helpful. Taking up ideal 
responsibility implies that one takes some (explicit or implicit) ideals as a compass for 
making specific behavioural choices. In ideal responsibility an actor acknowledges his own 
influence on a future state of affairs and determines and holds on to his own moral values 
concerning the issue at stake. Questions like 'In which world do we want to live?' and 'How 
do we want to treat animals and nature?' might be relevant in this context.  
 One might ask questions about the limits of moral responsibility. Some critics might 
be sceptical about what was described as ideal responsibility and conceive it as an 'unreal-
istic ideal'. One of the objects of moral communication between the different stakeholders 
in the food chain is to gain insight in each other's ideas about taking responsibility and - if 
possible - to develop common standards and ideals. Such an endeavour, however, faces 
some interesting problems. First, no shared operational definition of moral responsibility 
exists. Second, it is clear that companies - in a competitive market - are restricted in their 
possibilities. Third, the relation between self-regulation and government intervention is ob-
scure.  
 
Care 
One of the important features of trust, trustworthiness and responsibility is that focus is not 
only on actors and their behaviour but also on relations and interdependencies between dif-
ferent actors. The importance of relations and interdependencies has been a central focus of 
the ethics of care. The ethics of care draws special attention to unequal relations, vulner-
ability and dependency. The ethics of care might help us in developing our tools because 
communication within the food chain is communication between actors that are inter-
dependent and between actors that are (sometimes) vulnerable. 
 According to proponents of care ethics dependency, vulnerability and interdepend-
ence are important facts of life (Verkerk 2003). In contrast to the ideal that informs many 
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moral and political theories, people are not always equal and autonomous. Therefore, the 
moral question of an ethics of care is not 'What, if anything, do I (we) owe to others?' but 
rather 'How can I (we) best meet my (our) caring responsibilities?' (Tronto, 1993; 137). 
This leads to the following elements of a moral relation: 
 
- Attentiveness. This means that we should recognise the needs and concerns of others 
- others matter. Attentiveness requires that we know the needs of others and how 
those needs are affected by our own behaviour. Tronto says (1993; 128): 'evil can 
arise out of ignorance, either wilful or established habits of ignorance'. While Tronto 
describes attentiveness as 'other-directed', she acknowledges the prerequisite that 
one's own needs have to be sufficiently met before one is able to notice the needs of 
others at all. From this follows that attentiveness should also be self-directed. Caring 
for oneself is not the same as being selfish. 
- Responsibility. Meeting one's own caring responsibilities is crucial in care ethics. 
The big questions are what one's responsibilities are and what to do in case of con-
flicting responsibilities. Questions of responsibility can become political, i.e. they 
can become matters of public debate. Discussion about and distribution of responsi-
bility is crucial for care ethics.  
- Competence. Recognising a need and feeling responsible is not enough. In the end it 
is important that needs are met. Therefore, competence of giving care is important as 
well.  
- Responsiveness. As conditions of inequality and vulnerability exist and people are 
not all the same, it is important to practice empathy. One should be able to envision 
the other's frame of reference but not simply by presuming that the other is exactly 
like the self.  
 
 In ethical tools for moral communication these elements might function as process 
values.  
 
 
Conclusion 
With regard to the focus of the different tools that we would like to develop we can con-
clude from this analysis of trust, responsibility and care that: 
 
- The analysis of trust and trustworthiness supports the conclusion of chapter 1 that in 
order to facilitate moral processes in the food chain the emphasis should not be on a 
possible result, like trust or trustworthiness, but on the processes of moral communi-
cation;  
- Since responsibility in the food chain is often obscure and object of differences in 
opinion that lead to tensions and conflicts, tools are needed to clarify responsibilities 
and facilitate communication about how responsibilities are taken; 
- For facilitating moral communication in the food chain we should not only focus on 
distinct communicating actors but also on relations and interdependencies between 
these actors. 
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4.7 Existing Tools and Stakeholder Theory 
 
Our project does not need to start from scratch. Some tools are already used in practical 
contexts and may help us. This section describes eleven tools that seem to have potential 
relevance for facilitating moral communication in the food chain. We think that these tools 
can help us to develop tools for facilitating moral communication in the food chain. Next 
to these eleven tools, some of the tools described by WP1 are also relevant for us, i.e. the 
ethical matrix. We will include these tools in our evaluative task. 
 The tools that we found can be grouped under five headings. We found tools for: 1) 
ethical exploration, 2) ethical decision-making, 3) ethical identity expression, 4) manage-
ment of change, and 5) stakeholder dialogue. Since one could easily get the impression that 
we only need to adapt the last tool in the remainder of our work package, we will give spe-
cial attention to the problems that stakeholder theory faces. The reason for this is not that 
we mean to discredit stakeholder dialogue but to show which problems need to be tackled 
in the next - evaluative - task. 
 
Ethical exploration 
The first two tools that we selected are intended to facilitate ethical exploration: 
 
- Weston's Toolbox. The toolbox is meant to offer wider practical skills than in tradi-
tional ethics in order to get ethical thinking 'unstuck'. The intended outcome is to find 
new and better solutions to moral conflicts, which do justice to all or most of the un-
derlying values. 
- Value Clarification. A method to clarify and develop individual values. It also pro-
motes the development of a consistent set of values through a valuing process. 
 
 These tools are meant to open up ethical thinking and they could function in the first 
two phases of moral communication: self-clarification and understanding the others. 
 
Ethical decision-making 
The next two ethical tools are about ethical decision-making: 
 
- Ethical Accounting (for Livestock Farms). This tool is a decision support sys-
tem/management tool for individual farmers, involving value-based planning. 
- Stepwise Dilemma Solving. This method addresses and solves moral problems in a 
structured and stepwise way, which facilitates discussion and decision-making. 
 
 These tools focus at deliberation within an organisation or a group that has to take a 
common decision. These tools structure the different options and the different values and 
they provide organisations with elements for responsiveness with regard to decision-
making. 
 
Ethical identity-expression 
The next three tools are used by organisations in the food chain in order to express and jus-
tify their position on certain moral issues. For our research project the introduction of new 
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values or changing existing values is also an important way to change the organisation. 
Value clarification in companies is an element of what Swanson (1999) calls a value-
attuning culture that looks for ways to clarify values, expand and connect them and act 
upon them: 
 
- Normative Standards. This is a method used to co-ordinate normative behaviour. 
Many normative standards are developed by organisations. We will present the Fair 
Trade movement as an example, because it is an organisation that is trying to con-
vince other organisations to use a set of normative standards in conducting their 
business. 
- Ethical Codes. Many organisations have formalised their standards of conduct in an 
ethical code. We will present the example of Unilever, a large food company, to il-
lustrate this tool. In the next task of our research project we will use the ethical codes 
of more organisations in the food production chain like Nutreco and Nestlé. 
- Ethical Audits. In this method companies ask (external) auditors to check whether 
they performed according to their self-proclaimed standards and ethical codes. The 
purpose of this can be a) keeping their standards up-to-date, b) stimulating ethical 
awareness, accounting or checking compliance within their organisations, or c) creat-
ing a firm ground for stakeholder communication. 
 
 These tools focus at explicating and creating openness in how a company handles 
ethical problems. By doing so, companies make explicit how that they take up their social 
and moral responsibility. 
 
Management of change 
The following tools are not uses as 'ethical tools' but they are related to the way organisa-
tions in the food production chain change over time. This usually means continuous 
improvement. It is impossible to stay competitive without inventing new ways to produce 
better and cheaper. All kinds of ways to change an organisation exist: hire new people, de-
velop new products, change business processes, etc. The next three tools are standard 
methods to enhance quality in organisations: 
 
- Total Quality Management. A method to improve the quality of the internal proc-
esses of an organisation. It is all about the insurance of continuous improvement.  
- ISO method. The adoption of external standards, like the ISO 9000 series, in an 
organisation.  
- Benchmarking. This method actively looks for best practices in the environment of 
the organisation. Benchmarking offers an external perspective in the quest for service 
quality. 
 
 These tools are meant to help companies to keep up with their environment. They 
help companies to become dynamic entities. Moral communication can be seen as a form 
of keeping up with the environment. Therefore, these tools might be of help for developing 
our communicative tools. 
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Stakeholder dialogue 
Stakeholder dialogue represents a relatively new approach to decision-making and prob-
lem-solving. Firms used to be rather closed to their environments, independently 
developing their policies. Their main partners were shareholders and clients. By using 
stakeholder dialogues they try to open up to other groups that have something at stake in 
the activities of a company: 
 
- Stakeholder dialogues. This tools aims to increase transparency and trust in the rela-
tion between organisations and their stakeholders, and to organise more interactive 
forms of decision-making. 
 
 Companies that would like to employ stakeholder dialogue, however, need to answer 
the basic questions 'who is a stakeholder?' and 'what do we owe them?'. Stakeholder theory 
might help companies to answer these questions. 
 
Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory is about the relation between a corporation and others, the so-called 
'stakeholders'. A common feature is the assumption that stakeholders include more than a 
firm's shareholders alone. The first question that a firm needs to ask in applying stake-
holder theory is: 'Who are my stakeholders?'. Freeman (1984) defines stakeholder as 'any 
group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation's 
purpose'. This already poses the problem that those who can affect and are affected are not 
necessarily the same. Furthermore, it is not clear whether or not a group or individual 
needs to be affected directly in order to qualify as a stakeholder. Would it also count as 'be-
ing affected', if one cares about what a corporation does and how it affects others?  
 It is argued that stakeholders need not be actively involved. Being vulnerable with 
respect to the issue at stake is said to be enough to qualify as a stakeholder: When is one 
vulnerable? Does one need to take an interest in the situation or is it enough that one has an 
interest in it? Thus, the question is: can entities such as animals or the environment be seen 
as stakeholders? Does the same hold true, e.g., for children or sick persons not able to act 
on their own behalf? These questions show that it is not at all clear how a firm should de-
termine who are its stakeholders. It is helpful to distinguish three different ways in which 
stakeholder theories can look for an answer. They can consider the above questions as 'de-
scriptive', 'instrumental' or 'normative' (Donaldson and Preston, 1995): 
 
- Descriptive theories describe and sometimes explain the operations of companies in 
relation to affected parties. In order to answer the above-mentioned questions firms 
could, in a descriptive way, simply make an inventory of individuals and groups with 
whom they actually deal.  
- When the stakeholder approach is used as a tool for efficient management, one may 
speak of instrumental theories. A central insight of (that kind of) stakeholder theory 
is that maintaining good communication with stakeholders is crucial for the efficient 
implementation of strategies. Stakeholders are those who might intervene with the 
implementation of a business decision or policy. In order to implement the decision 
or policy as smoothly as possible those parties have to be engaged one way or the 
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other. The instrumental understanding of the concept implies that only agents can be 
stakeholders. Stakeholders must be able to act upon the company or public decision-
maker in question, otherwise the company or decision-maker does not need to worry 
about them: they are not considered stakeholders.  
- When stakeholder theory is used normatively, it says what the relation of companies 
to affected parties should be and who or what should be counted as a stakeholder. 
Sometimes normative theories also say what moral and philosophical guidelines a 
company should follow.  
 
 For our purpose of enhancing moral communication in the food chain and between 
the food chain and consumers, it is obvious that the normative approach is needed. We do 
not merely wish to describe how things are. Our tools are meant for mutual amelioration of 
the values at hand. Thus, we are not so much interested in the responsibilities that people 
happen to take at a certain moment in time but rather in a process to improve the way that 
they take their responsibilities. Of course, in order to elaborate on this, it is important to 
know something about the values that people adhere to and about their situation. Before 
searching for normative guidelines, it is important to understand the situation of, e.g., the 
company. In that sense of knowing the context, descriptive stakeholder theory might be 
useful to answer the question of with whom company deals and how. Indirectly, instru-
mental stakeholder theory might also be relevant, because existing relations might be 
determined by a firm's strategic and instrumental considerations. This empirical informa-
tion is, however, not an end in itself for our work package but instrumental in developing 
ameliorative communicative tools.  
 In order to generate a basis for a 'real' stakeholder dialogue the question is not 
whether a company sees its relation with a stakeholder as an instrumental device in order 
to perform well. The 'real' question is (Kaler, 2003) whether a company can accept role-
specific responsibilities towards non-shareholders that are crucial to corporate identity. 
This means that living up to these responsibilities is an ultimate objective of corporate ac-
tivity and not merely a strategic device or by-product of striving after other objectives. 
Also stockholder theory acknowledges role-specific duties towards non-shareholders, such 
as the requirement to pay employees their wages, provide customers with products, pay 
suppliers for their products, and contribute to the tax revenues of local communities. Only 
if one transcends these strategic uses of stakeholders, one will transcend stockholder the-
ory. This seems a necessary precondition for a non-strategic stakeholder dialogue.  
 From this Kaler (2003) draws the conclusion that fulfilment of responsibilities to-
wards stakeholders is the ultimate objective of corporate activity according to a stakeholder 
theory that aims at achieving a more equitable distribution of benefits among shareholders 
en non-shareholders. Serving the interests of stakeholders is what these responsibilities 
amount to. It is important to note that one can see serving interests as a 'task' rather than an 
'achievement'; it is not a matter of 'yes or no' but of 'more or less'. As such, the aim is com-
pletely fulfilled only in so far as it is attuned to the maximum degree possible under the 
prevailing conditions. This is important because it opens up the possibility of dialogue 
about how to work on the task. It generates room for process-oriented approaches.  
 It is important for the following tasks of our work package to disclose the black box 
of stakeholder theory - and stakeholder approaches of companies - to normative investiga-
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tion, comparison and enhancement. This is important because stakeholder approaches seem 
to play an important role in what companies describe as their engagement with ethical is-
sues.  
 
Conclusion 
With respect to the way that we can develop tools in this work package, we can conclude 
from the description of eleven practical tools and the more in-depth analysis of stakeholder 
theory that:  
 
- An important task in the evaluation of the practical use of existing instruments (like 
stakeholder dialogues, standardisation and auditing) will be to clarify the normative 
basis of decisions about the scope (e.g. stakeholder identification, auditing standards) 
and the goals (creating support, informing those involved, understanding opposition 
and showing openness) of their application. 
- An important part of the evaluation is to clarify the relation between structure and 
contents of ethical processes. It is clear that certain instruments focus specifically on 
procedural values, while others focus on substantive values. For facilitating moral 
communication both are necessary and therefore we need both kinds of tools. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
The work plan of WP3 stated: 'A trustworthy food chain is of vital importance for consum-
ers' confidence in their daily food. The maintenance of this consumer trust is - in turn - of 
vital importance for primary producers, retailers and regulators in agriculture and food 
production'. Communication about the values involved in food production, their impor-
tance and their consequences for practical matters in the food chain, is necessary for 
gaining and keeping this trustworthiness. Value communication, however, is not without 
problems. It seems that corporations/firms have limited experience with this kind of moral 
communication and that tools to facilitate this communication are needed.  
 In this first task we have made a description of several existing tools and other step-
ping-stones that might be helpful in developing tools for improving this value 
communication. From this first descriptive task we have learned several things that will 
guide us in the next - evaluative - task of this work package. 
 The main conclusions that we draw from the descriptive task concern the central ob-
jective of the work package, facilitating moral communication in the food chain. With 
regard to this central objective we draw four conclusions: 
 
- In order to facilitate moral processes in the food chain the emphasis should not be on 
a possible result, like trust or trustworthiness, but on the processes of moral commu-
nication;  
- It is important to distinguish different stages of moral communication (self-
clarification, understanding the other, comparison and communication), because each 
stage requires different tools; 
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- Communication is not only build on conceptual skills; social skills are equally 
important and we need to address their importance; 
- The tools for facilitating moral communication in the food chain should not only fo-
cus on distinct stakeholders but also on their relations and interdependencies. 
 
 With regard to the different tools that we would like to develop in this work package, 
we draw five conclusions from the descriptive task: 
 
- For self-clarification and understanding the others the role of real and perceived 
identities is important: tools are needed to construct and deconstruct identity and 
imago;  
- For self-clarification and understanding the others the role of language and the way 
positions are framed are important: tools are needed to disclose the role of metaphors 
and frames in shaping identities; 
- Actors in the food chain co-operate in a common food practice with more or less 
shared standards for food safety and food quality: communicative ethical tools need 
to build on initiatives to organise the food practice on the basis of common interests 
and responsibilities; 
- Actors in the food chain also operate also as rivals in a competitive market. In these 
markets ethical standards, labels and trademarks function as competitive instruments: 
ethical tools need to allow a process of fair comparison of different standards in this 
competitive market;  
- Responsibility in the food chain is often obscure and value differences lead to ten-
sions and conflicts: tools are needed to clarify responsibilities and facilitate 
communication about the way responsibilities are taken. 
 
With regard to the way that we can develop tools in this work package, we draw two con-
clusions from the descriptive task:  
 
- It is an important part of the evaluation of the practical use of existing instruments 
(like stakeholder dialogues, standardization and auditing) to clarify the normative ba-
sis of decisions about the scope (e.g. stakeholder identification, auditing standards) 
and the goals (creating support, informing those involved, understanding opposition 
and showing openness) of their application. 
- It is an important part of the evaluation to clarify the relation between structure and 
contents of ethical processes. It is clear that certain tools focus specifically on proce-
dural values, while others focus on substantive values. For facilitating moral 
communication both are necessary and therefore we need both kinds of tools. 
 
In section 4.2 of this report we defended that three kinds of tools need to be developed to 
facilitate the different phases of moral communication: 
 
- Instruments that enable actors in the food chain to formulate their own answers to 
relevant questions; 
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- Instruments that enable actors in the food chain to understand the answers of others; 
and  
- Instruments that enable actors in the food chain to start communication about emer-
gent conflicts. 
 
 In the following tasks of this project we will have to a) clarify the character of our 
tools, b) design our different tools, and c) test them in practice. 
